How Does Politics Shape National Security?

Julian E. Zelizer, a Professor of History and Public Affairs at Princeton, came across the idea for his Arsenal of Democracy: The Politics of National Security – From World War II to the War on Terrorism shortly after 9/11. Watching Americans react to the event, Zelizer said, he was interested in “how quickly politics reemerged after that event, and how quickly both parties started to fight with each other.” He added, “Many people said, this shows it’s not like it used to be — in the past, we would have handled these decisions together as a country.” Zelizer set out to find if that was true. Below, he discusses his surprising findings about how politics has shaped national security decisions, from the Cuban Missile Crisis to the closing of Guantanamo.

Q. What is the arsenal? What did it mean for Franklin Roosevelt and what does it mean today?

A. For Roosevelt it means starting to produce the weapons and munitions that were going to be needed in World War II. He’s literally in this fireside chat, calling on the nation to support a mobilization in preparation for war. In his mind, this means factories in Detroit being converted from factories that produce automobiles to factories that could produce various kinds of weapons.

The arsenal of democracy, from the perspective of a 2010 observer, became much bigger than that. It includes many components. It includes national security organizations in government like the CIA and the National Security Council. It includes military budgets that support contractors and spending on permanent weapons systems. It includes, before 1973, a draft by which young men were conscripted when they reached a certain age, and much more. It became a vast network of institutions and policies that were permanently dealing with protecting the home front.

Q. How did that process of expanding the arsenal – from Roosevelt’s conception to what we have today – begin?

A. It’s gradual. You see some before World War II. America is always at war. But in the past, after wars ended, we took everything apart. That’s what we did after World War I and the Spanish American War. But as we became more and more comfortable with war, and more involved with bigger operations as well as a more permanent role for America abroad, the mobilization was simply bigger. In the late 1940s, after World War II and as the Cold war was accelerating, Congress starts to make a very big commitment to becoming a permanent national security state for the fight against communism. This is when we enact what’s called the Truman Doctrine, where we start spending money to help non-communist forces. We create the National Security Council and the CIA and much more. So it’s in the late 1940s when the battles with the Soviet Union are intensifying that we see what we think of as the national security state created.

Q. So the national security state began with Democrats?

Arsenal of Democracy, by Julian E. ZelizerA. Yes. We do tend to think of Republicans as the hawks. In the 1940s and 50s many Democrats are just as hawkish. Part of it is circumstance. FDR is a Democratic president, and he’s in charge when the nation faces the threats of fascism in Germany and Japan. So part of it is simply a president who reacts to what happened in the 1940s – just as Truman reacts to the Soviet Union and its perceived aggression. Part of it is ideology. Many Democrats agreed with what I call liberal internationalism – they were comfortable with the idea that America had to permanently be involved overseas. They were comfortable building government programs to be used for national security, and they were as anti-communist as their Republican counterparts. They believed in multilateral institutions – that the U.S. needed to work with other countries through organizations like the UN to resolve these problems. Democrats also believed in the importance of sacrifice, meaning citizens had to sacrifice to the public good (through the draft, taxes and more) in the effort to protect national security interests. They had a guiding philosophy that helped them support these efforts.

There was political pressure as well. Republicans started to attack the Democrats. Some started to say that Democrats were not being tough enough on communism – after World War II, it was the Republicans who looked weak on defense. Many of them had not supported the war, and many were accused of being isolationists. One response from Republicans like Richard Nixon, then in Congress, was for example to attack the Democrats and say, now that World War II is over, Democrats are not being tough enough in places like Eastern Europe in fighting against the Soviet Union. Republicans promoted an ideology of conservative internationalism that emphasized fighting communism in Asia, giving greater weight to pursuing communist spies at home than protecting civil liberties, more of an emphasis on air power and bombs over ground troops, giving more influence to military leaders to shape strategy, and arguing that domestic programs should be cut to protect military spending. Conservatives shed their aversion to government when it came to national security. Under attack as early as 1946, Democrats felt the pressure to show their chops.

Q. When and how did the Republicans develop their national security agenda?

A. Right after World War II is when this takes place. The party feels battered after World War II. FDR is this great hero, and Democrats essentially have the world – they led a very decisive military operation. There is a cohort of Republicans in the 1940s who say, we need to challenge the Democrats and focus on a series of issues and say Democrats are not doing enough. One issue is hunting and finding communist spies here in the U.S. They argue that there are spies in the State Department and that the Democrats are not doing anything about it. A second issue after 1949 is the fall of China to the communists. This becomes a central issue. Many Republicans said that Truman is unwilling to provide enough support to China, and that’s why the revolution succeeded. And the third issue after 1950 is Korea and the stalemate that emerges there. Many Republicans from 1950 to 1952 are saying Truman and the Democrats can’t handle national security challenges. They use all these issues to build a Republican anti-communist agenda, which puts Democrats on the defensive. Once again, I call this conservative internationalism.

Q. One episode we tend to think of as particularly lacking in partisan politics is the Cuban Missile Crisis, but you found this wasn’t the case.

A. That was my favorite chapter to write. The Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 is the quintessential moment of diplomacy. Kennedy faces down this threat from the Soviet Union and is able to avert nuclear war through careful deliberation and decision-making. But what I found is that the Cuban Missile Crisis didn’t start in October 1962, where we usually start the story. It starts in the summer of 1962 when Republicans decided to make Cuba a mid-term election issue. In the summer of 1963, there are Republicans accusing the administration of ignoring evidence that the Soviets are putting missiles and other weaponry in Cuba. Senator Ken Keating of New York and Senator Homer Capehart of Indiana are leading this charge. Others, like Barry Goldwater, the future presidential candidate, are also making this argument. It’s a major issue in September and October.

When Kennedy famously discovers the photographs proving that there are Soviet missiles installed in Cuba, he’s instantly aware of the political implications. Republicans have accused him all summer of ignoring these missiles, and here he has evidence that they were correct. On the very day Kennedy secretly sees the photographs, the Republican National Committee announces that Cuba would be a major issue in the mid-term elections. In the final two weeks of October, Kennedy not only has to resist pressure from military advisers like Curtis LeMay, who want him to authorize a military strike, but he has to avoid political pressure that he’s facing from Republicans charging that he was wrong all along and that the U.S. needs to use force. He resists those political temptations and pressures and does something which could have been politically dangerous. It’s a very politicized crisis, which I certainly didn’t realize until I jumped into the archive.

Q. How dangerous is the politicization of national security?

Julian E. ZelizerA. It’s always politicized. There are moments when politicians can avoid the politics, or work around it. There are moments too when politics sends good messages to politicians. Sometimes you don’t want your politicians in a closed room alone. You want them to hear what the electorate is saying. But politics can also be a negative influence. The chapter on Vietnam in 1964 and 1965 really stresses the political origins of Lyndon Johnson’s escalation of the war. Johnson came of age in the 1950s, in that very partisan atmosphere. He was always terrified that if he didn’t prove he was tough on defense, the Republicans would use that against him in elections and constrain his ability to accomplish his domestic programs. So when he’s facing proposals to withdraw forces in 1964 and 1965, even being told by hawks in Congress that this is not worth doing, don’t intensify, his response is, I don’t want what happened to Harry Truman and Adlai Stevenson to happen to me. I don’t want to be accused of losing Vietnam like Truman was accused of losing China. Johnson is terrified of the Republican right. It’s an important aspect of why he accelerated that war. That’s one example where you can see politics having a detrimental effect on national security.

One other example is the politics of détente in the 1970s. This is the policy that Richard Nixon and Gerald Ford promoted. It was essentially easing relations with the Soviet Union through arms negotiation and trade. It was about opening relations with China. If Watergate hadn’t happened, that would be looked back on as a huge achievement by Richard Nixon. He changed the tone of the Cold War and opened up dialogue with both countries that you can say opened a path for Ronald Reagan in the 1980s. Ford in 1976 backs away from détente, and one reason is that in 1976, he’s challenged in the Republican primary by Ronald Reagan, a fellow Republican who accuses Ford of being too soft with the Soviet Union, and says détente undermines American strength, that we’re giving everything away and getting nothing in return, and that the Soviets shouldn’t be trusted. And Ford – there’s documentation of this from his archives – literally stops saying the word détente during the Republican primaries. Strategists like Robert Teeter say it’s too damaging to talk about détente when we need to shore up support with conservatives. Ten years later détente remerges. But for that moment, in the 1970s, it was undermined because of politics. So you can see how politics can have a detrimental impact on national security.

Q. When has politics has a positive impact?

A. Between 1966 and 1973 politics is essential to gradually and slowly reversing our course in Vietnam. Ultimately, antiwar forces and even middle class Americans were showing by 1968 and 1969 that they were against Vietnam. That was a very powerful countervailing force to the military operations that Johnson had started. Had he been more sensitive to those voices earlier, rather than more fearful of the Republican right, it all might have taken a different course.

And to return to my discussion of détente, before it’s killed by politics in the Republican party, under Nixon, politics helped détente. Nixon was paying close attention to the politics when he formed his policy of détente. He didn’t do it just because it was a great strategic idea. He saw that it could help him build a very broad political coalition. His Chief of Staff notes in his diaries that Nixon should become “Mr. Peace” in 1972, and undercut the Democrats. Republicans wanted to show that the country was safer under them, and that they were more capable of achieving peace than a Democrat ever would be. Détente, before it was brought down by politics, is propped up by politics.

Very explicit political considerations drive Nixon when he goes to China in February of 1972. The White House flies over an entire TV studio – which was a huge thing to do at the time – so that the whole trip could be covered. He wanted voters to see what he was doing. Political incentives led to a policy that was hugely important and hugely successful.

Q. How is Barack Obama handling the politics of national security so far?

A. He comes in not unlike Lyndon Johnson. He comes in a period when Democrats are perceived to be weak on defense, when they’re seen as being unable to confront the major threat of the time, terrorism. Democrats faced similar kinds of accusations from the Republican party, back when that threat was communism. Clearly Obama’s administration is very sensitive to that and very careful that they don’t expose themselves to that charge. Part of what Obama has faced from day one is forming policy in an environment where the party is being persistently attacked for being weak on defense. It creates a difficult atmosphere for foreign policy. Part of the effect you’ve seen is he’s withdrawn on some propositions where he wanted to change how we fought the war on terror. He announced that he would close Guantanamo as soon as he took office, yet he’s backed off. Many Democrats complained that they were being attacked in their districts, with Republicans saying that the President will force terrorists to be in your backyard. I think it’s pretty clear that political blowback has inhibited him from following through on that major promise.

The second thing he has backed off on is the civilian trial of one of the 9/11 masterminds. He made a big proclamation, a signature proclamation, to change President Bush’s policies and say we can do this through our court system, not just through our military system. Yet, he backed off in large part because of attacks from New York officials and Republicans saying this was dangerous and that cities and suburbs could never handle trials like this.

One of the open questions about Obama’s Afghanistan policy is how much politics was a factor in those inner deliberations about what to do in terms of increasing the troops. I don’t think we know yet. There are signs of political compromise. The argument that we needed to be more aggressive in Afghanistan came out of the 2006 and 2008 campaigns, where Democrats tried to distinguish themselves from Republicans. He is following through on the campaign promise of a time limit for when troops would be withdrawn. Part of the reason for that was to send a signal to countries like Pakistan, but it’s also meant to give American voters a sense that this is not an unending war, that it can be contained and ended in a few years. And when you have Rahm Emanuel by your side, it’s likely that politics was part of the entire decision making process. It’s always there.

Q. Is the political debate about national security more heated today?

A. I don’t think so. I think it’s been very heated in other moments. When I look back at the 1940s and 1950s, sometimes it makes today’s politics seem downright tame. You had accusations from Joe McCarthy that the Truman administration was literally allowing communist spies to work freely in the State Department. That’s treason. In the ’52 campaign, Nixon, who is running for Vice President, calls Democratic candidate Adlai Stevenson “Adlai the appeaser” and makes really very heated attacks that were quite commonplace during that time. There’s clearly a nostalgia for those times, but if you look back, you can see politics were always pretty intense and vicious, and that’s just how we handle these issues.

*Photo by Pete Souza courtesy The White House.


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