A Privilege to Die: Inside Hezbollah’s Legions and Their Endless War Against Israel
by Thanassis Cambanis

–Reviewed by Adam Fleisher

It cannot be pleasant to have Hezbollah as your enemy. Led by the charismatic Hassan Nasrallah, who has cultivated something of a cult of personality, the organization has clear goals (the takeover of Lebanon and perpetual war with Israel) that enjoy broad support from the Shia of southern Lebanon and sympathetic neighboring regimes. Its legions are either ideologically committed or effectively coerced. Its warriors enjoy a reputation as brave souls who won the 2006 war against their archenemy, Israel, by simply surviving. It has a patronage system that keeps the Shia of southern Lebanon sympathetic to the cause, if not actively involved in the fighting. And it has friends with deep enough pockets (Syria and Iran, in particular) to enable funding of both social services and militarization, sparing Hezbollah from having to figure out how create wealth or economic benefits. The result is both a narrow central group of fighters who find joy and honor in sacrificing themselves to the struggle against Israel and a broad outer circle of potential human shields who are prepared to die as martyrs and cause Israel to suffer in the court of public opinion.

That is just some of what can be learned from Thanassis Cambanis’ A Privilege to Die, an account of Hezbollah that interweaves the summer 2006 war with Israel and Lebanon’s power struggle between the western-friendly, secular-minded “Axis of Accommodation” and Hezbollah’s “Axis of Resistance.” Cambanis, who covered the war for The New York Times, contends that Hezbollah emerged from the war greatly strengthened, with more influence in Lebanese politics. This outcome ran counter to the wishful thinking of leaders in the United States and Israel that Hezbollah would be politically crushed for having instigated the conflict.

In 2000, Hezbollah had achieved a great victory with the withdrawal of Israel from the south of the country. But moderate Lebanese triumphed with the 2005 “Cedar Revolution,” compelling Syria to withdraw its intelligence officers and troops from the country after the brazen bombing-assassination of the anti-Syria former prime minister Rafik Hariri. Hezbollah marshaled pro-Syria street protests but was overwhelmed by Lebanese seeking independence.

The Cedar Revolution was short-lived. It didn’t help that, as Syria left, “a string of mysterious assassinations ensued,” wiping out much of the independent and moderate political elite. But it was the war with Israel-which Hezbollah hadn’t even intended to instigate, as Nasrallah later admitted-that ultimately led to political triumph. As one prescient shopkeeper told Cambanis, “This war will be good for Hezbollah, good for the Shia, but I don’t think it will be good for the rest of us, or for Lebanon.”

Cambanis suggests that the Bush administration, perhaps unaware of the strength with which Hezbollah had emerged, offered only half-hearted support to the “Accommodation” government, while the Iranians and Syrians-along with Hezbollah-recommitted themselves to achieving political control of the country. Hezbollah quickly moved to frame itself as victorious, to help rebuild bomb-riddled southern Lebanon, and to “contest the political structure.” (The fruits of these efforts were finally realized just weeks ago, when Prime Minister Saad Hariri, son of the assassinated Rafik, was forced from power and replaced by Hezbollah’s choice, Najib Miqati.)

Hezbollah clearly punches above its weight. The organization has only a few thousand core fighters under its banner, but “men and women, numbering in the tens and perhaps hundreds of thousands, volunteered to help Hezbollah during the 2006 war with Israel.” A Privilege to Die argues that Hezbollah, while fanatical, is anything but stupid. It has deftly cultivated potential allies, soliciting weaponry, money and logistical support from regional powers like Iran and Syria. It has also managed to organize everything it does around one goal: resistance. Therefore, while Westerners might try to distinguish between the group’s military efforts and its social services, Hezbollah will have none of that. It is totally integrated. Everything from fighting wars to newscasting to providing health care is part of the same institutional structure.

Those who use Hezbollah’s services become more receptive to its ideology. What Hezbollah encourages is “self-reliance, empowerment, and a fearless confidence nourished by bracing and regular bouts of warfare.” The aim is to keep its followers “always in a personal state of exultation and self-improvement-and perpetually angry at some great power out to destroy them.” The fully committed “inner core” of fighters and adherents appeals to an outer core of hundreds of thousands of “sympathizers who never rise to the level of official membership, but provide Hezbollah much of its political, cultural, social, and military capital.”

A Privilege to Die offers an unnerving account of Hezbollah’s allure, but Cambanis hints at a vulnerability. Hezbollah is powerful enough in southern Lebanon to influence the standard of living of the local Shia; Cambanis suggests that since material improvements might snuff the “candle of austerity and martyrdom,” Hezbollah has historically discouraged economic development and individual autonomy and instead provided basic services with financial support from Iran and Syria. So far, this policy has worked: the group and its ideological sympathizers “value their beliefs at least as much as their pocketbooks-if not more.” But what will happen now that Hezbollah appears to be in control of all of Lebanon? The model of austerity, martyrdom, and perpetual Islamic Resistance has worked well with the impoverished but religious Shia in the south, who have borne the brunt of fighting with Israel. The rest of the country, however, is less fanatically committed to resistance and more economically self-sufficient. So it remains to be seen how Hezbollah will sell its agenda outside of the south–or how it will sustain its ideal of perpetual resistance.

Further Reading: Hezbollah: A Short History (Princeton Studies in Muslim Politics) by Augustus Richard Norton and The Media Relations Department of Hizbollah Wishes You a Happy Birthday: Unexpected Encounters in the Changing Middle East by Neil MacFarquhar

Buy the book: Skylight Books, Powell’s, Amazon

Excerpt: “On July 16, 2008 Hezbollah’s victory in Operation Truthful Promise was finally at hand. The Party of God had smashed the moderate Arabs who wanted a tamer, more cooperative polity; now it had an opportunity to sucker-punch Israel. A banner in English hung at the border: ‘Pain in Israel, Joy in Lebanon.’ Like most of the day’s proceedings, it was a carefully designed piece of stagecraft, directed at Israel and the West. Hezbollah wanted the world to know just how many people lauded Samir Quntar; they knew the headlines would read ‘Child killer gets hero’s welcome,’ and they wanted their enemies to see the multitudes willing to fete Israel’s terrorist as a freedom fighter.”

Adam Fleisher is a law student at the University of Virginia.

*Photo courtesy of looking4poetry